keimena/content/theses/metaphysika/on free will/existence.md

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title
the existence of free will

the existence of free will

why we are rather than not

In order to define and then converse on ideas relating to free will, one must first convince themselves on its existence. Surely one can simply make a definition, as well as talk about the emergent system much like any other metaphysical structure, but for there to be a reason to do so, one must be able to argue for its existence.

On this matter, there are many different arguments, however I will focus on the three that I find the strongest; this does not mean that one can prove existence, but these seem to strongly suggest and support that free will is indeed part of reality.

Before I express these arguments, I would like to take some time to explain why the existence of free will is an unprovable truth. Apart from the ideas discussed earlier [on logical fallacies]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on logic/fallacies" >}}), and [on axioms]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on logic/axioms" >}}), there is another reason, metaphysical in nature, and inseparable from the existence of the God.

If one is to believe in a God that loves them fully and unconditionally, one must also believe that such a God would never force them to believe in Him; rather He would give them the option to choose to do so. In such a situation, any factual proof for the existence of God is unwanted, both by Him, and by any believer, since any such proof would force them to believe in Him, depriving them of the choice.

In the same vein, by proving the existence of free will, any person would be forced to accept it as a factual truth, which would go against their very nature, which is endowed with free will. Thus, the existence of free will is as unprovable as the existence of God.

Having said the above, I can now present the arguments.

The first argument has to do with the simplicity of the system, and involves creating a system in which free will is absent, which makes said system much more complex and obtuse. This, because one must explain why and how the constructs (since we don't talk about living things if free will is absent, but mere constructs) came to be, as one might observe them. As a very good friend mentioned, without free will persons are but functions, receiving an input and producing an output. However, I (a concept that does not exist without free will) can both observe, and change the "output" before it is ever expressed, which is easier explained with free will than without.

The second argument is concerned with aesthetics, and the relation between the nature of beauty, and that of Truth. In due time these will be expanded upon, but for now we will use the idea as is.

The second argument thus is as follows; it is much more beautiful for there to be free will, than for there to not be.

Obviously such a statement is extremely subjective, but such a statement is true for the totality of knowledge. Unfortunately the nature of communication makes it impossible to describe beauty and sentiment, so I choose not to expand on this argument.

Finally, we can simply make an admission, without any extra argumentation. Besides, it is obvious that there is no need for a person to justify or rationalize every aspect of their faith, nor are they obligated to answer to anybody except for themselves. It is therefore possible, and maybe even proper, for someone to define the existence of free will axiomatically, ignoring any other argument for or against it.