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| title | weight |
|---|---|
| defining free will | 2 |
defining free will
trying to define the modes of actions
If we accept [the idea of free will existing]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on free will/existence" >}}), we should be able to define it, in order to be able to self reference and call upon to make use of this idea. This also helps in clarifying the meaning, which in everyday speech is muddled, much like most of language, due to the nature of communication (more on that at a later point).
Alongside free will, there are two more modes of behaviour in nature, determinism and pure randomness. Discussing these first is necessary to properly define free will, since these are directly observable in the outside world; free will is only directly observable in the inner state of the self, with the admission that others behave similarly.
The first term we will explore is determinism, the idea that things in nature behave in a predefined, preordained way. This mode of action is generally linked with non sentient or better yet non living things, such as rocks, metals, everyday objects that we make use of etc. By claiming that they move deterministically, we claim that there is, theoretically if not literally, a way by which we can obtain every single bit of information about the past and the future of the object under study, subject to an adequate amount of information about the current state. Here, by theoretically one can imply the existence of a perfect measurement device, that can give accurate measurements up to any level of significance one might care about. This does not guarantee absolute and complete knowledge of a system, but rather guarantees that the object in question behaves predictably, under a known or unknown set of laws, physical in nature. This means that a deterministic object cannot operate on its own, as it is fully under the influence and flow of the external world.
True randomness is the exact opposite. True randomness implies that under any circumstances, there does not exist a mechanism or set of predefined laws that we can use to guarantee that the outcome will be aligned with any prediction one might make. In this way, true randomness can only be partially predicted with the use of mechanisms that predict expected, or average behaviours, without the possibility to definitively correctly guess a single outcome. As a truly random behaviour cannot be dictated by external factors, since it would be just an extremely complex deterministic system, true randomness is not dictated by any factors.
Both of the above mechanisms appear to influence the individual. Determinism creeps in as pressure, both environmental and evolutionary, while truly random behaviour might manifest as a spontaneous, if instantaneous, change.
These however do not provide for a mechanism that allows for the individual to be influenced by their own inner state. Since deterministic behaviour has a set output for a given input, and random behaviour is nonsensical by definition, there needs to be a mechanism by which the person can, by observing and acting on themselves, change and manipulate a behaviour or outcome.
This mechanism is free will.