keimena/content/theses/metaphysica/on logic/_index.md

title
on logic

on logic

introduction

In this part, I attempt to deconstruct logic; with one singular purpose, to prove that logic is not self consistent, and therefore fails the necessary condition set by logic itself for a mode of thinking to be useful. This is done since, if logic itself is paradoxically true and false at the same time, it probably does not exist.

This is beneficial, because with the existence of logic one is extremely limited to the ideas that they can discuss; truthfully one can only speak of mathematical concepts given that logic is the only way to approach reality.

To show that we can talk about the unobservable and infallible, I create a weak and a strong claim of axiomatic reliance. The weak claim deals with the nature of axioms as a matter of faith, whilst the strong claim deals with the axiomatic reality of all knowledge.

table of contents

1. [the nature of faith]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysica/on logic/axioms" >}})

2. [concerning fallacies]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysica/on logic/fallacies" >}})