diff --git a/content/theses/metaphysika/_index.md b/content/theses/metaphysika/_index.md index 64f40b4..f103c00 100644 --- a/content/theses/metaphysika/_index.md +++ b/content/theses/metaphysika/_index.md @@ -1,17 +1,22 @@ --- -title: "metaphysica" +title: "metaphysiká" weight: 1 bookFlatSection: true --- -# metaphysica +

metaphysiká

-## introduction -'metaphysica' deals with the unseen, unverifiable, and infallible ideas and processes that I observe as influencing, or guiding, every day life. +

introduction

+'metaphysiká' deals with the unseen, unverifiable, and infallible ideas and processes that I observe as influencing, or guiding, every day life. -This corpus is split into parts; the first part attempts to deconstruct logic, and the second one deals with free will. As more parts are written this page will expand to include them too. +This corpus is split into parts; the first part attempts to deconstruct logic, the second one deals with free will, and the third one with defining ethics. + +As more parts are written this page will expand to include them too. + +

table of contents

-## table of contents 1. [on logic]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on logic" >}}) 2. [on free will]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on free will" >}}) + +3. [on ethics]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on ethics" >}}) diff --git a/content/theses/metaphysika/on ethics/_index.md b/content/theses/metaphysika/on ethics/_index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26e1105 --- /dev/null +++ b/content/theses/metaphysika/on ethics/_index.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +--- +title: "on ethics" +weight: 3 +--- + +

on ethics

+ +Having [defined free will]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on free will/definition" >}}), I can now discuss about the ethical. + +Before I do so, I first want to explain in depth why free will is a necessity for ethics to exist. + +Assuming a system with either only determinism, only random outcomes, or a combination of both, there is no adequate mechanism of choice, for there to be a capacity to commit an action. There is no possible way to define a person as anything more than a process that acts as an input/output method, much like a rock, or a drop of water. These objects, bereft of agency as they are, are unable to make a decision, and so do not deserve to be morally labelled. For what does it mean for a stone to be immoral or unethical? Should we accuse water of falling too harshly when rain turns to hail? No, for there to be an ethical consideration, the subject must uniquelly be able to make a choice, and to act based of *its own volition*. For ethics to exist, [free will must exist]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on free will/existence" >}}). + +There have been many and there will be many more attemps to define ethics and morality in an objective sense, however most fail due to their flawed attempts to define good and evil in an objective manner, which requires an objective arbiter who decide which acts are good and which acts are evil, and hand out reward and punishment respectively. + +The above necessity forms the basis of many modern religions. Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and Jews have a clear seperation of a Heaven and a Hell, where people are sorted into based on merit (Some Catholics also admit into their faith the notion of a Purgatory. Protestants don't form a cohesive, centralised group, and are therefore inconsistent. These are discussions for another time.). Tibetan Buddhism seperates reality into seperate levels, with the human level being the 'ideal', neutral point, and reincarnation moving the individual up or down the levels based on the merit of the last life, with the capacity to remove oneself from the cycle and join the Buddhas. Hinduism teaches a similar idea, that one reincarnates as a being of lower or higher 'standing' depending on their behaviour in the past life, without necessarily making a distinction of different tiers of existence, but rather of quality of being, again with the capacity of breaking the cycle of reincarnation and liberating the self (Liberating implies that the individual is trapped in "earthly shakles" (the body) which is also a position taken by the neoplatonists. This is also a discussion for another time.). + +All of this to say that throughout history, the prevalent mode of defining an ethic was by defining 'good' as something that brought one closer to 'the divine' and 'evil' something that had the opposite effect. This obviously is deeply flawed. Not only do you need to ignore the underlying circular reasoning of "good is defined as not being evil and evil is defined as not being good", but you also need to define what and why the divine considers it to be so, which varies amongst cultures and locations. An example of this is that various mesopotamian civilisations, most notably the Phoenicians, considered it moral and good to sacrifice infants to their deities, most prominently Baal, which the Romans of the same time period considered to be a barbarous atrocity. Another example of the dynamic and therefore subjective nature of this type of ethics is the fact that the arbitrary concepts of good and evil in the current era, with the various ideas and practices that are currently tolerated by the majority of the population, vary wildly from the same concepts of good and evil from a few decades ago. + +This does not imply that ethics are destined to be subjective, or that morality cannot exist, but rather it necessitates the foundation of a new concept of ethics. + +A friend of mine asked me to think of this as a person placing their hand in of an open flame. Irregardless of any subjective pleasure or displeasure one might derive from the event, there is an objective process that happens, the hand burning, and the natural response to this which is to pull the hand from the flame. Exactly because of the existance of a free will and a capacity to choose, one might choose to maintain their hand in the flame, or remove it from it. Therefore, one can define as a good thing to remove their hand from the process. While it may or may not be subjectively good for the person, there is an objective process, the burning of the hand, that can be defined as 'not good', because it damages the individual. This is the objective basis for ethics. + +Since the above holds for the individual, we must extend this to interpersonal relationships. Such a task is easy; knowingly putting another person's hand in the flame, or leading them to do so, counts as an unethical action. Of importance is to note that the action is unethical, not the person. This is thusly because a person has the capacity to act in both an ethically good and an ethically bad manner. At the same time, a person might regret their past actions and seek forgiveness; this cannot be seen as anything but atonement, and therefore since a person has the ability to regret, there can not be a universal, permanent ethical alignment of the individual, at least up to and until the point of death. + +Because of the effective societal pressure in interhuman interactions, there is an additional claim concerning objectively ethical actions. Any attempt to nonconsensually interact with a person, violating their capacity to voluntarily engage, can be labeled as a malicious act; even if the person acts unknowingly, they have deprived the other indeividual of their free will and have therefore commited a bad act. diff --git a/content/theses/metaphysika/on free will/definition.md b/content/theses/metaphysika/on free will/definition.md index a98de67..22290a8 100755 --- a/content/theses/metaphysika/on free will/definition.md +++ b/content/theses/metaphysika/on free will/definition.md @@ -3,9 +3,8 @@ title: "defining free will" weight: 2 ---

defining free will

-

trying to define the modes of actions

-If we accept [the idea of free will existing]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on free will/existence" >}}), we should be able to define it, in order to be able to self reference and call upon to make use of this idea. This also helps in clarifying the meaning, which in everyday speech is muddled, much like most of language, due to the nature of communication (more on that at a later point). +If we accept [the idea of free will existing]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on free will/existence" >}}), we should be able to define it, in order to be able to self reference and call upon to make use of this idea. This also helps in clarifying the meaning, which in everyday speech is muddled, much like most of language, due to the nature of communication (This is a discussion for a later time.). Alongside free will, there are two more modes of behaviour in nature, determinism and pure randomness. Discussing these first is necessary to properly define free will, since these are directly observable in the outside world; free will is only directly observable in the inner state of the self, with the admission that others behave similarly. diff --git a/content/theses/metaphysika/on free will/existence.md b/content/theses/metaphysika/on free will/existence.md index 3e272d6..d36cece 100644 --- a/content/theses/metaphysika/on free will/existence.md +++ b/content/theses/metaphysika/on free will/existence.md @@ -3,27 +3,25 @@ title: "the existence of free will" weight: 1 ---

the existence of free will

-

why we are rather than not

-In order to define and then converse on ideas relating to free will, one must first convince themselves on its existence. Surely one can simply make a definition, as well as talk about the emergent system much like any other metaphysical structure, but for there to be a reason to do so, one must be able to argue for its existence. +In order to define and then converse on ideas relating to free will, one must first convince themselves on its existence. Truthfully, one can simply make a definition, as well as talk about the emergent system much like any other metaphysical structure, but there is merit in being able to argue for its existence. On this matter, there are many different arguments, however I will focus on the three that I find the strongest; this does not mean that one can prove existence, but these seem to strongly suggest and support that free will is indeed part of reality. -Before I express these arguments, I would like to take some time to explain why the existence of free will is an unprovable truth. Apart from the ideas discussed earlier [on logical fallacies]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on logic/fallacies" >}}), and [on axioms]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on logic/axioms" >}}), there is another reason, metaphysical in nature, and inseparable from the existence of the God. +Before I express these arguments, I would like to take some time to explain why the existence of free will is an unprovable claim. Apart from the ideas discussed earlier [on logical fallacies]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on logic/fallacies" >}}), and [on axioms]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on logic/axioms" >}}), there is another reason, metaphysical in nature, and inseparable from the existence of the God. -If one is to believe in a God that loves them fully and unconditionally, one must also believe that such a God would never force them to believe in Him; rather He would give them the option to choose to do so. In such a situation, any factual proof for the existence of God is unwanted, both by Him, and by any believer, since any such proof would ***force*** them to believe in Him, depriving them of the choice. +If one is to believe in a God that loves them fully and unconditionally, one must also believe that such a God would never force them to believe in Him; rather He would give them the option to choose to do so. In such a situation, any factual proof for the existence of God is unwanted, both by Him, and by any believer, since any such proof would ***force*** them to believe in Him, rather than ***choose*** to do so. -In the same vein, by proving the existence of free will, any person would be forced to accept it as a factual truth, which would go against their very nature, which is endowed with free will. Thus, the existence of free will is as unprovable as the existence of God. +In the same vein, the existence of free stops any unrefutable proof from being possible, since every person would be forced to accept it as a factual truth. Thus, the existence of free will is as unprovable as the existence of God. Having said the above, I can now present the arguments. -The first argument has to do with the simplicity of the system, and involves creating a system in which free will is absent, which makes said system much more complex and obtuse. This, because one must explain why and how the constructs (since we don't talk about living things if free will is absent, but mere constructs) came to be, as one might observe them. As a very good friend mentioned, without free will persons are but functions, receiving an input and producing an output. However, **I** (a concept that does not exist without free will) can both observe, and change the "output" before it is ever expressed, which is easier explained with free will than without. +The first argument has to do with the simplicity of the system, and involves creating a system in which free will is absent, which makes said system much more complex and obtuse. This, because one must explain why and how the constructs (since we don't talk about living things if free will is absent, but mere constructs) came to be, as one might observe them. As a very good friend mentioned, without free will persons are but functions, receiving an input and producing an output. However, "***I***" (a concept that does not exist without free will) can both observe, and change the "output" before it is ever expressed, which is easier explained with free will than without. -The second argument is concerned with aesthetics, and the relation between the nature of beauty, and that of Truth. In due time these will be expanded upon, but for now we will use the idea as is. +The second argument is concerned with aesthetics, and the relation between the nature of beauty, and that of Truth. In due time these will be expanded upon, but for now one may use the idea of "*Beauty is Truth*" as is. The second argument thus is as follows; it is much more beautiful for there to be free will, than for there to not be. Obviously such a statement is extremely subjective, but such a statement is true for the totality of knowledge. Unfortunately the nature of communication makes it impossible to describe beauty and sentiment, so I choose not to expand on this argument. Finally, we can simply make an admission, without any extra argumentation. Besides, it is obvious that there is no need for a person to justify or rationalize every aspect of their faith, nor are they obligated to answer to anybody except for themselves. It is therefore possible, and maybe even proper, for someone to define the existence of free will axiomatically, ignoring any other argument for or against it. - diff --git a/content/theses/metaphysika/on logic/axioms.md b/content/theses/metaphysika/on logic/axioms.md index dd7759e..bc00d7a 100644 --- a/content/theses/metaphysika/on logic/axioms.md +++ b/content/theses/metaphysika/on logic/axioms.md @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ title: "the nature of faith" weight: 1 ---

the nature of faith

-

a thesis on the axiomatic foundation of knowledge

The words "logic" and "knowledge" are often connected in the minds of humans. In the sciences, logic is used religiously, in an attempt to obtain knowledge, in the same way that it is used in religions. diff --git a/content/theses/metaphysika/on logic/fallacies.md b/content/theses/metaphysika/on logic/fallacies.md index 4c5ee09..016f763 100755 --- a/content/theses/metaphysika/on logic/fallacies.md +++ b/content/theses/metaphysika/on logic/fallacies.md @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ title: "concerning fallacies" weight: 2 ---

concerning fallacies

-

most, if not all, appeals to logic are appeals to authority

To conclude the [discussion on logic]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysika/on logic/axioms" >}}), I would like to examine in depth the propagation of knowledge, in order to present the greatest result; the fact that most appeals to logic are themselves a logical fallacy.