18 lines
1 KiB
Markdown
18 lines
1 KiB
Markdown
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title: "on logic"
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---
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# on logic
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## task
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In this part, I attempt to deconstruct logic; with one singular purpose, to prove that logic is not self consistent, and therefore fails the necessary condition set by logic itself for a mode of thinking to be useful. This is done since, if logic itself is paradoxically true and false at the same time, it probably does not exist.
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This is beneficial, because with the existence of logic one is extremely limited to the ideas that they can discuss; truthfully one can only speak of mathematical concepts given that logic is the only way to approach reality.
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To show that we can talk about the unobservable and infallible, I create a weak and a strong claim of axiomatic reliance. The weak claim deals with the nature of axioms as a matter of faith, whilst the strong claim deals with the axiomatic reality of all knowledge.
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## table of contents
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1. [the nature of faith]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysica/on logic/axioms" >}})
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2. [concerning fallacies]({{< relref "/theses/metaphysica/on logic/fallacies" >}})
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